Abstract
Introduction
With the rapid-increasing population of the Internet, people tend to communicate with each other through the common but insecure channel. Hence, how to prove the source and confirm the integrity of the transmitted message is an important issue. Because digital signature can provide integrity, nonrepudiation, authentication of data, it is often employed and plays an important role in electronic commerce.
Identity-based cryptosystem is a novel type of cryptographic scheme proposed by Shamir [1] , which enables any pair of users to communicate securely, and to verify each other's signatures without exchanging public or private keys, without keeping any key directories and without using the services of any third party. Problems with the traditional Public key cryptosystems (PKCs) are the high cost of the infrastructure needed to manage and authenticate public keys, and the difficulty in managing multiple communities. Whilst ID-based PKCs will not replace the conventional public key infrastructures, it might prove to be a complementary technology. Since ID-based cryptography was included, many different ID-based encryption schemes and signature schemes have been appeared.
Group signature is a relatively new concept introduced by Chaum and van Heijst [2] in 1991. A group signature scheme allows a group member to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group such that any one can verify the signature but no one (except group manager) can find out which group member produce it. However, group manager can reveal the identity of the originator of a signature in case of a dispute. At the same time, no one (including the manager) will be able to falsely accuse any other member of the group. Group signatures have many practical application, such as e-voting, e-bidding, e-cash and fingerprinting system, etc. if we combine group signature with ID-based cryptosystem to construct a new signature, which is significant. But, to the best of my knowledge, most of ID-based group signature schemes are insecure and inefficient.
As an important technique, Group signature allows any member of a group to sign on behalf of the group. Anyone can verify the signature with a group public key while no one can know the identity of the signer except the Group Manager. Further, it is computational hard to decide whether two different signatures were issued by the same member. Plenty of group signature schemes [2, 8, 12, 13, 22] have been presented after the Chaum and van Heijst's initial works.
However, most of them are much inefficient for large groups because the group public key and the length of the signature depend on the size of the group. Also, new member addition and revocation require re-issuing all members' keys and changing the group public key. In 1997, Camenisch [9] presented the first efficient group signature schemes for large groups in which the group public key and the length of signature are both of constant size. In 2000,Ateniese et al [1] proposed a practical and provably coalition-resistant secure group signature scheme based on knowledge proof signature, and the scheme is the state-of-the art one. ID-based group signature scheme is firstly proposed by Park, Kim and Won [21] . The scheme is much inefficient: the length of the group public key and signature are linear to the size of the group; more precisely, the identity of each member must be included in the group public key. Furthermore, Mao and Lim [20] showed that the anonymity of the scheme was not guaranteed. Tseng and Jan [27] presented a novel ID-based group scheme. However, it is universally forgeable [17] and not coalition-resistant [16] . In 2001, C.Popescu proposed a novel ID-based group signature based on the bilinear pairings of algebraic curves. Unfortunately, the scheme has the linkability, Name that two different group signature can been distinguished whether they are produced by the identical signer.
Recently, the bilinear pairings of Elliptic Curve has already became a strong tool to construct ID-based cryptosystem, and many ID-based signature scheme and encrypting scheme were proposed [4, 6, 15] , but there is a trusted center KGC in their ID-based cryptosystem. It is responsible for producing the secret key of each member and may forge member's signature; so that the bilinear pairing of Elliptic Curve is not available for constructing group signature scheme.
Recently, to increase efficiency of group signature, Elaalim et al. proposed a short ID-based group signature by combining two ID-based signature schemes. And they claimed that their scheme were secure and unlikable. Unfortunately, by analyzing the scheme, we show the scheme is universal forgeable and linkable. Finally, the corresponding attacks are given.
In the rest of the paper, in section 2, we review security model and security requirements of IDbased group signature; in section 3, Elaakim et.al group scheme is reviewed; In section 4,Elaakim et al short ID-based group signature scheme is analyzed; Finally, we draw a conclusion of the paper in section 5 .
Preliminaries
In this section, we first present some background on groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps. Next, we recall the definition and anonymity of unforgeability of group signature.
We review bilinear maps, using the following standard notation [14, 15] . 2 We note the modified Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves are examples of such admissible pairings. The security of the scheme discussed in this paper is based on the following security assumption.
Security Model and Security Requirement of Group Signature
The concept of group signature was introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [1] . It allows a group member to sign a message on behalf of the group. Any one can verify group signature with the group public key. In case of a dispute, the group manager can open the signature to identify the signer. A group signature scheme is comprised of the following procedure.
(1) Setup: A probabilistic algorithm that generates the group-specific parameters. The input to Setup is the set of public parameters, which includes a secure parameter, and its output are the group public key PK and the corresponding secret key SK. (2) Join: An interactive protocol between the group manager and a user that results in the user becoming a valid group member. (3) Sign: An interactive protocol between a group member and a user whereby a group signature on a message supplied by a user is computed by the group member. (4) Verify: A deterministic algorithm for verifying the validity of a group signature given a group public key and a signed message. (5) Open: A deterministic algorithm that given as input a message, a group signature on it, and the group secret key, extracts the membership certificate used to issue the signature, and non-interactive proof of the signature's authorship. A secure group signature should meet the following requirements:
(1) Correctness: Signature produced by a group member using Sign must be accepted by Verify. (2) Unforgeability: Only group member are able to sign messages on behalf of the group (3) Anonymity: Given a signature, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for any one except the group manager. (4) Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different signatures were generated by the same group member is computationally hard. (5) Exculpability: A signature produced by a group member cannot be successfully attributed to another, and the group manager cannot generate signature on behalf of other group members (non-framing). (6) Traceability: The group manager can always establish the identity of the member who issued a valid signature. (7) Coalition-resistance: a colluding subset of group members cannot generate a valid group signature that cannot be traced. The requirements of unforgeability and coalition-resistance are equivalent to the requirements that group membership certificates be unforgeable under passive and active attacks, respectively, and only issuable by the group manager. In other words, a membership certificate should contain the equivalent of a digital signature by the group manager. Similarly, the requirements of traceability and exculpability imply that the group signature should hide a regular digital signature issued by the member.
Review of Elaalim et al. Short ID-based Group Signature Scheme
In the section, we review Elaalim et.al's short ID-based group signature scheme from bilinear map. The scheme consists of the five phases: system parameters setup phase, key extraction, signature generation, verification and open phase. Please the interested reader refer to [10] for detail.
System parameters setup phase: Let G 1 , G 2 be two cyclic groups with the same order q and e: G 1 G 1 G 2 is a bilinear map.H 1 and H 2 are two cryptography hash functions which satisfy H 1 :{0,1}*G 1 Z q * and H2:{0,1}* G 1 G 1 . The group manager (GM) chooses a random sZ q * and generates a generator GG 1 , and computes pub P sG  as public key. Finally, the system public parameters are as follows: Sign phase: Assume that user wants to sign message m with his membership certificate (xdG, S ID ) , and selects a random kZ q and computes the following:
,where
Finally, the resulting group signature on message m is (U,V,R,W). The reason to produce such attack is that R and V in the group signature are random elements of group G 1 . The form of them is not fixed. An adversary can random choose two elements to set their form, thus our attack is mounted.
At the same time, we can notice give a group signature (U,V,R,W), in the verification phase, the public key Q of the user with identity ID is included. Thus, the scheme doesn't also satisfy unlink -ability of group signature.
Conclusion
Recently, A short identity based group signature scheme from bilinear pairing is proposed by Elaalim et.al, which combines two identity group signatures [4, 23] . And they claimed that the scheme have some advantages over the group signatures in [4, 23] . At the same time, they also claimed that the scheme is secure against forgeability attack and linkability attack. Unfortunately, in the paper, we show that the scheme is insecure, it exists universal forgeability, namely, anyone can forge a group signature on arbitrary message; and the scheme is linkable, namely, given two different group signatures, anyone can distinguish whether they are produced by the signer. Finally, the corresponding attacks are mounted, and the reasons to such attacks are analyzed.
